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Abstract
A question of interest to scholars of International Politics concerns the manner 
in which weaker states attempt to influence stronger ones. This article offers a 
case study of one recent exercise in coalition-building among southern powers 
as a vehicle for change in international relations. It analyzes the global interests, 
strategies and values of India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) and the impact of the 
IBSA Dialogue Forum on the global order. Five major points are outlined. First, 
common ideas and values shape the global discourse of the emerging coalition. 
Second, soft balancing based on a value-driven middle power discourse is a suit-
able concept to explain IBSA’s strategy in global institutions. Third, institutional 
foreign policy instruments such as agenda-setting and coalition-building are 
pivotal elements of IBSA’s soft balancing approach. Fourth, the trilateral coalition 
suffers from considerable divergence of interest in global governance issues 
and limited potential gains of its sectoral cooperation, particularly in trade, due 
to a lack of complementarities of the participating economies. Finally, despite 
these obstacles the IBSA Forum has impacted the global order in recent years 
as a powerful driver for change. India, Brazil and South Africa have contributed 
to an incremental global power shift in their favour. The southern coalition 
also induced a change in the character of multilateralism and, in particular, its 
procedural values.
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IBSA: Origin in the Context of a Shifting World Order
States playing a leading international role in rule-making are given special 
importance as far as the treatment of transnational problems is concerned. This 
applies to questions of world trade as well as to transnational security risks. 
Attempts to solve problems under these policies can be organized both at the 
regional and global levels. In both cases, some state actors play a more important 
role than others in developing cooperation and negotiation processes and have, 
therefore, more influence on the results. The reason can be their greater military 
or economic potential. In the same way, their legitimacy, diplomatic effectiveness, 
moral authority as well as their representative function for a region or group of 
states might generate advantages in international bargaining.
Recently, many studies have pointed to global power shifts in favour of the 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) and other rising powers (Cooper and 
Antkeiwicz 2008; Goldman Sachs 2007; Mahbubani 2008). Hitherto existing 
power poles in Europe and North America are expected to lose relative military 
and economic power, and even the dominance of Western culture and values is 
contested (Cox 2007; Ikenberry 2008; Zakaria 2008). The India-Brazil-South 
Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum is a coalition of emerging powers intended to 
benefit from the global power shifts. It was launched in June 2003 in Brasilia. 
Three months later, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, President 
Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
formed the Group of Three (G-3) during the fifty-eighth UN General Assembly 
session and contributed crucially to the failure of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Conference in Cancun by pressing for fundamental changes in the agri-
cultural subsidies regimes of the developed world. After several ministerial meet-
ings, President da Silva, President Mbeki and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 
held the first IBSA Summit in Brasilia in September 2006. The three governments 
coordinated their standpoints and voting behaviour in the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) conference in Havana and the sixty-first UN General Assembly session, 
where South Africa was elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security 
Council (2007–08) for the first time. Since then, IBSA has held regular minis-
terial meetings and heads of government summits in Pretoria (2007), New Delhi 
(2008) and Brasilia (2010).
A quick glance at IBSA’s schedule highlights the strengthening of diplomatic 
ties between the three emerging southern powers over the last few years. Together, 
India, Brazil and South Africa lobby for reforms at the United Nations that allows 
for a stronger role for developing countries, which constitute the majority of the 
UN member-states. Nevertheless, the troika is not envisaging an alternative world 
order that privileges the developing world. Its initiative is instead firmly located 
in the existing international order, as the Brasilia Declaration1 suggests: ‘Respect-
ing the rule of international law, strengthening the United Nations and the Security 
Council and prioritizing the exercise of diplomacy as means to maintain inter-
national peace and security’.
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While the IBSA initiative may thus be seen as an effort to increase the bargain-
ing power of developing nations, it equally focuses on concrete areas of cooper-
ation between South Africa, India and Brazil. Trade, energy security, health and 
transport are the most prominent issues of IBSA’s sectoral collaboration. IBSA 
can therefore be characterized as both a strategic alliance for the pursuit of com-
mon interests of developing countries in global institutions and a platform for 
bilateral, trilateral and interregional South–South cooperation. Sectoral cooperation 
will form a sound base for trilateral diplomacy in world affairs.
How does and will the emerging coalition’s diplomacy impact the global order? 
Different scenarios of the future world order have been suggested: the systemic 
transformation can open out into a concert or cartel of powers (Kagan 2008), a 
‘non-polar world’ (Haass 2008), ‘unstable multipolarity’ (Humphrey and Messner 
2006), ‘multi-multipolarity’ (Friedberg 1994; Nolte 2008) or a ‘multiregional 
world order’ (Flemes 2008; Hurrell 2007). The point of departure is the current 
global order, which reflects a mixture of a concert of great powers and multiregional 
structures. It consists, on the one hand, of Europe as a relatively functional region 
and, on the other, of many great powers without functional regions, such as the 
United States, China, Russia and India. Brazil and South Africa are now at cross-
roads and can actively pursue global strategies with or without their regions. The 
choices and strategies of Brazilian and South African foreign policy-makers can 
affect the balance between the aforementioned conceptions of global order.
The positions of emerging powers from the South (on the one hand, between 
the centre and the periphery of the current global order and, on the other, at the 
nexus of international and regional politics) demand particularly complex foreign 
policy strategies. Strategic approaches have to consider at least three contextual 
factors: first, the continuing superiority of established (the United States) and 
emerging (China) global actors in terms of material power; second, the fact that 
regional and global affairs are increasingly interrelated; and finally, the fact that 
foreign policy strategies are mapped out against the background of an international 
system moving from a unipolar to a multipolar order.
On the basis of these observations, the article, first, highlights the common 
ideas and values shaping IBSA’s global discourse; second, it addresses the foreign 
policy strategies pursued by IBSA; third, it reveals the common and divergent 
interests of the three players in global governance and sectoral cooperation; and 
finally, it analyzes the impact of IBSA’s policies on the global order.
IBSA’s Value-Driven Middle Power Discourse
The overriding goal of middle powers is to create rules and institutions of global 
governance. Accordingly, their foreign policy objectives overlap with the ‘civilian 
ends’ (Duchê.ne 1973; Maull 1990) of foreign policy such as responsibility for the 
global environment and diffusion of equality and justice. These are ‘milieu goals’ 
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rather than ‘possession goals’, to use Arnold Wolfers’ (1962: 73–74) distinction. 
Possession goals further the national interests, for instance, through power aggre-
gation. Milieu goals aim to shape the environment in which the state operates. 
Milieu goals may only be a means of achieving possession goals, but they may 
also be goals that transcend the national interests and are shared widely. In other 
words, a sense of ‘global responsibility’ (Schoeman 2003: 351) is present in the 
case of a middle power. According to the behavioural definition, middle powers 
engage in middle-powermanship: ‘the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to 
international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in inter-
national disputes and the tendency to embrace notions of “good international citi-
zenship” to guide diplomacy’ (Cooper et al. 1993: 19).
At first glance, the category of middle powers seems particularly promising 
for explaining the common behaviour patterns of the IBSA member-states which 
found their aspirations on a value-driven discourse committed to democracy, 
peace and development. In the 2006 Brasilia Summit Declaration, Singh, da Silva 
and Mbeki reaffirmed their commitment to promoting peace, security, human 
rights and sustainable social and economic development in the world. Regarding 
sustainable development, they underscored the importance of addressing the chal-
lenges of global warming under the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change and its Kyoto Protocol. In addition, IBSA urged the donor countries to 
meet their development assistance targets to fully implement the outcomes of the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development held in 2002 in Johannesburg. The 
IBSA states also agreed in Brasilia to coordinate their contributions to the UN 
Human Rights Council and stressed their common understanding regarding the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights. Prime Minister Singh even argued 
that IBSA’s normative approach reflected a common identity of its member-states. 
He said: ‘IBSA is a unique model of transnational cooperation based on common 
political identity. Our three countries come from three different continents but 
share similar world views and aspirations’. 2
The functional leadership of IBSA/G-3 has been most evident in the WTO 
negotiations. Leading the G-21 coalition of developing countries in the Doha 
Round, India, Brazil and South Africa demanded the establishment of global mar-
ket conditions that would allow the developing countries to benefit from their 
comparative advantages in agriculture, industry and services. Thus, the troika has 
cooperated with a view to eliminating the high non-tariff barriers to trade imposed 
by the developed countries. Other demands aim to reform the Bretton Woods 
institutions: the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) legitimacy depends on re-
forming the system of quotas to make it more representative of the developing 
world; the World Bank’s President has always been a US citizen and appointed by 
the US government just like the IMF’s Managing Director has always been an 
European. The legitimacy of these two institutions tends to increase if both the 
positions are made open to all nationals and elected by their members.
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But the middle power approach can only partially explain the strategy of the 
IBSA states. There is some evidence that the engagement of IBSA/G-3 in middle-
powermanship (Cooper et al. 1993) to defend the principles of good global citi-
zenship and democratic multilateralism is merely a discursive flagship to pursue 
possession goals and national interests. From a neorealist perspective, the over-
riding goal of state actors consists of power aggregation at the expense of other 
states (Mearsheimer 2001: 2) and ascent in the international hierarchy of states.
First, the G-3 has not always spoken on behalf of the global South. It is true 
that the WTO negotiations have failed because the industrialized countries have 
not been willing to reduce their agricultural subsidies to a sufficient extent, but the 
G-3 has not been representing the net food importers, most of whom are the least 
developed countries (LDCs), which are not interested in the reduction of the agri-
cultural subsidies in Europe and the United States that keep prices low. The 
majority of the LDCs are Sub-Saharan African, South Asian and Latin American 
countries, which have not felt represented by their ‘regional leaders’. This can be 
seen as a first hint that IBSA’s approach is more pluralistic than universalistic in 
essence.
Second, while the WTO negotiations have hardly progressed in terms of con-
tent, the IBSA states have been able to improve their positions in the international 
trade hierarchy. At the 2004 WTO conference in Geneva, Brazil and India were 
invited to form the G-5 preparation group at the heart of the WTO trading system 
together with the European Union, the United States and Australia. At the German 
G-8 Summit in 2007, Brazil, India and South Africa (with China and Mexico) 
were invited to formalize their dialogue with the elitist club of the richest indus-
trialized countries through the so-called Heiligendamm or O-5 process. While 
these invitations already reflected the increasing acceptance and recognition of 
their (prospective) major power status by the established great powers, the 
Pittsburgh G-20 Summit in September 2009 reaffirmed the prominent role of the 
IBSA countries and five other emerging economies from Asia and Latin America 
(China, Indonesia, South Korea, Argentina and Mexico). The summit also favoured 
a shift in country representation at the IMF by providing at least 5 per cent of its 
membership to the emerging markets. The G-20 will become the new permanent 
council for international economic cooperation and will essentially replace the 
G-8, which will continue to meet on major security issues, but will carry reduced 
influence. 
Third, IBSA’s global justice discourse is doubtful, since Brazil and India have 
been striving (with Germany and Japan) for permanent UN Security Council 
membership. India and Brazil invited South Africa to join the group, but the latter 
had to abide by the African Union guidelines which prevent it from fielding its 
candidacy on its own. The UN High-level Panel had suggested an alternative, 
more participatory plan for a regular system of rotating members, which would 
have led to a more effective redistribution of global power, but India and Brazil 
rejected it. In any case, the expansion of the Security Council would privilege 
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only a few players. In order to achieve lasting democratization of the United 
Nations, the General Assembly would have to be strengthened.
These examples of IBSA’s foreign policy behaviour suggest that the middle 
power elements are mainly discursive or ‘strategic’, whereas power aggregation 
is actually the true end of the emerging coalition’s foreign policy. Thus, the IBSA 
states’ global approach would roughly consist of a discursive strategy that lays 
emphasis on its representative function for the developing world in general and 
their regions in particular, while it simultaneously aims at becoming members of 
the great power club. But a doubtful discourse may not be enough to change the 
power distribution in the IBSA states’ favour and to enable them to become global 
decision-makers. What are the complementary strategic options that India, Brazil 
and South Africa can pursue in order to gain global influence, prestige and bar-
gaining power?
Soft Balancing: Flexible Coalition-Building in Global 
Institutions
The foreign policy options for the IBSA states are limited in view of the over-
whelming hard power of the current hegemon. Although Brazil, India and South 
Africa enjoy increasing influence, they are still located at the periphery of the 
current world system and command relatively modest material resources. A cru-
cial reason for US hegemony in international relations is its military supremacy. 
Washington accounts for more than half of the global defence expenditure (SIPRI 
2008) and 60 per cent of the world’s research and development spending (BICC 
2008). In conventional military terms, the United States will remain the dominant 
global power for a long time. Therefore, hard balancing based on countervailing 
military alliances (external balancing) and arms build-up (internal balancing) is 
not a viable option in the medium-term. Huntington (1999: 37) uses the concept 
of a uni-multipolar system to describe the current structure of the international 
system. From a realist perspective, a multipolar system can only be achieved by 
the emergence of regional unipolarities that build coalitions to balance the super-
power (Wohlforth 1999: 30).
As Nye (2004: 30) argues, real global unipolarity requires the hegemon’s dom-
inance in two additional playing fields: global economics and other transnational 
problems such as terrorism, crime, global warming and epidemics. As the current 
economic crisis demonstrates, transnational problems can only be resolved 
through the cooperation of many players. Consequently, these must be the playing 
fields on which emerging powers gain global influence; their success will depend 
largely on the soundness of their team play. India, Brazil and South Africa have 
already demonstrated their ability to advance particularly their economic goals 
within the existing order. In comparison, the gains to be expected from violently 
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overturning the current international order are rather limited (Ikenberry and 
Wright 2008). Therefore, institutional strategies seem to be important for impact-
ing the international hierarchy of states.
Soft balancing does not directly challenge US military preponderance, but ra-
ther uses non-military tools to delay, frustrate and undermine the superpower’s 
unilateral policies (Pape 2005: 10). Soft balancing involves institutional strategies 
such as the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, such as IBSA, 
G-3 and G-21, to constrain the power of the United States and other established 
great powers. This institutional strategy is also referred to as ‘buffering’, and aims 
to extend the room for manoeuvre by weaker states vis-à-vis stronger states 
(Greenfield Partem 1983). It also involves strengthening economic ties between 
emerging powers through sector-related collaboration. This could possibly shift 
the balance of economic power in the medium-term. Paul (2005: 59) lists three 
preconditions for soft balancing behaviour:
(1) The hegemon’s power position and military behaviour are of growing concern but 
do not yet pose a serious challenge to the sovereignty of second-tier powers; (2) the 
dominant state is a major source of public goods in both the economic and security 
areas that cannot simply be replaced; and (3) the dominant state cannot easily retaliate 
either because the balancing efforts of others are not overt or because they do not directly 
challenge its power position with military means. While pursuing soft balancing, 
second-tier states could engage the hegemon and develop institutional links with it to 
ward off possible retaliatory actions.
‘Binding’ strategies aim to restrain stronger states through institutional agreements 
(Ikenberry 2003). Indeed, Brazil, India and South Africa maintain linkages with 
the United States in a variety of issue areas and to different degrees of institu-
tionalization. In March 2006, the United States and India entered into a ‘Strategic 
Partnership’, which includes cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
and US arms supplies. Agreements on civilian nuclear cooperation with Brazil 
and South Africa (both signatory states of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 
NPT) were concluded in the 1990s. President Bush and President da Silva signed 
a cooperation agreement on bio-fuels in March 2007. Moreover, the Organization 
of American States (OAS) connects Washington and Brasilia in several ways, and 
the two states were the principal negotiators in the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) process. The US-Southern African Customs Union (SACU)3 negotiations 
for a Free Trade Area began in June 2003, in which South Africa has been a 
dominant player. Critics of the soft balancing approach are right in their argument 
that other categories such as economic interest or regional security concerns are 
alternative explanations for second-tier states’ foreign policy behaviour (Brooks 
and Wohlforth 2005: 74). But these explanations do not exclude each other; they 
are complementary and synergistic. 
Washington does not threaten the sovereignty of the emerging powers, and a 
soft balancing coalition maintains a low profile. After the first ministerial meeting 
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of the IBSA Forum, Brazilian Foreign Minister Amorim was keen to emphasize 
that IBSA does not want to create new geopolitical divisions: ‘This is a group to 
spread goodwill and the message of peace—we are not against anyone’ (quoted in 
Miller 2005: 52).
Amorim’s statement can be disproved to a certain degree by looking at the soft 
balancing tools used by the IBSA states. Pape (2005: 36–37) points out territorial 
denial, entangling diplomacy and economic strengthening as soft balancing 
mechanisms. When the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, sought in 2002 
to use Brazilian airbases and other military institutions in the Amazon region, 
Brasilia not only refused to accept the request but also denied over-flying rights 
for military aircrafts involved in the Colombian conflict (Flemes 2006a: 243). 
Brazil also took a critical stance on a bilateral treaty on the use of seven Colombian 
military bases by the US armed forces in September 2009. The extension of the 
United States military engagement in South America led to harsh disputes in 
the Union of South American States (Flemes and Nolte 2010). Further, despite the 
Pentagon’s deep strategic interests, there are no US military bases either in India 
or South Africa.
The most important foreign policy instruments of IBSA are what Paul 
(2005: 57) has called ‘economic strengthening’ and ‘entangling diplomacy’. The 
former aims to shift relative economic power through trading blocs and other 
types of sectoral cooperation that increase the economic growth of members, 
while directing trade away from non-members. The latter describes the use of the 
rules and procedures of international institutions in order to influence the foreign 
policy:
Indeed sovereignty may be increasingly defi ned not by power to insulate one’s state 
from external infl uences but by the power to participate effectively in international 
institutions of all kinds. […] There is no great puzzle as to the advantages that often lead 
intermediate states to favor multilateralism and institutions […]: the degree to which in-
stitutions provide political space […] to build new coalitions in order to try and effect 
emerging norms in ways that are congruent with their interests and to counter-balance 
or defl ect the preferences of the most powerful; and the extent to which institutions 
provide ‘voice opportunities’ to make known their interests and to bid for political sup-
port in the broader market place of ideas. (Hurrell 2000: 3–4)
India, Brazil and South Africa use global governance institutions and summits to 
build new coalitions to pursue common interests. As mentioned earlier, IBSA was 
launched at the 2003 G-8 meeting in Evian, and the G-3 was established during 
the UN General Assembly session in the same year. The strategy of using inter-
national institutions to build South –South coalitions culminated in the creation 
of the G-21, with its widely recognized impact on global economic governance at 
the WTO conference in Cancun. The Doha Round particularly demonstrates the 
troika’s ability to determine the institutional agenda in order to influence emerg-
ing international norms in favour of their interests.
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The IBSA leaders use international organizations as platforms to challenge the 
legitimacy of the present international order and to change the existing dominant 
norms. In his capacity as Chairman of the G-77, President Mbeki said at the NAM 
Conference in September 2006 in Havana:
The strengthening of South-South co-operation has helped to create a stronger voice 
for the developing countries in multilateral forums […] especially with regard to the 
on-going process of fundamental reforms of the UN as well as the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (quoted in Cape Times, 18 September 2006). 
Emerging powers counterbalance the interests and preferences of established 
great powers within global institutions. Brazil and India are the fourth and fifth 
most active complainants under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Along 
with others, they have used international institutions to resist attempts by the 
United States to promote new norms regarding the use of force, including pre-
emptive war, the conditionality of sovereignty or the right to use force to promote 
regime change (Hurrell 2006: 11). By opposing the US-led Iraq intervention in 
2003 at the United Nations, the three states (and other major powers) denied legit-
imacy to the United States and tried to frustrate its war plans by reducing the 
number of countries willing to fight along with it. For instance, Brazil and South 
Africa successfully backed many smaller Latin American and African states des-
pite considerable pressure from Washington.
In sum, the IBSA states play key roles in a multiplicity of global institutions. 
They are highly integrated in the global order and operate within global institutions 
in order to enhance incremental power shifts. Ultimately, this course of action is 
intended to transform the global order in favour of emerging powers in the 
medium-term. To accomplish this goal, India, Brazil and South Africa are active 
and innovative in developing new cooperation processes such as the G-3 and the 
G-21. The emerging powers pursue a strategy of ‘latent multi-institutionalization’ 
(Flemes 2009), which is reflected in its omnipresence on the global stage in flexi-
ble coalitions (G-3, G-4, O-5, G-20, G-21, G-77), all of them characterized by 
low degrees of institutionalization. This strategy guarantees national sovereignty, 
flexibility and independence to IBSA’s foreign policy-makers.
Common and Divergent Interests in Global Governance 
and Sectoral Cooperation
The IBSA states’ common interest of power aggregation and their partly successful 
transformation into decision-makers of the new global order have been examined 
in the previous section. But how will they use their influence in real terms? Is 
IBSA an interest alliance when it comes to global governance issues or will all 
three states pursue unilateral and divergent interests on the basis of their commonly 
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on January 9, 2014isq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
International Studies, 46, 4 (2009): 401–421
410 Daniel Flemes
gained major power status? A similar question arises with regard to the potential 
synergies of sectoral cooperation and complementarities of the economies of 
India, Brazil and South Africa.
Global Trade: Lack of Common Positions in the WTO Negotiations
During the WTO negotiations, divergent positions of the three Southern powers 
became clear in the Doha Round. For instance, regarding the agricultural issue, 
Brazil defended a broad liberalization of the global agricultural business, whereas 
India demanded protection against agricultural imports. Agricultural commodities 
are responsible for one-third of Brazilian and only 13 per cent of Indian exports. 
At the same time, 70 per cent of employment in India is located in the agricul-
tural sector, while the share in Brazil is only 40 per cent (Las Casas Campos 
2009). The higher productivity and competitiveness of Brazil’s agribusiness ex-
plains its average agricultural tariff of 10 per cent. India’s tariff rate of 61 per cent 
for agricultural products is one of the highest in the world. The agricultural sector 
in South Africa contributes only 3 per cent to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
does not reflect a great share of the country’s exports. South Africa’s average tariff 
rate for agricultural imports is 40 per cent (WTO 2008a). Considering the power-
ful domestic interests, particularly in India, where millions of farmers depend for 
their livelihood on agriculture, and in Brazil, where the agribusiness federations 
wield large political influence, a common IBSA position with regard to the agri-
cultural issue is hardly realistic in the medium-term.
In general, India’s economy is still marked by the consequences of four decades 
of import-substitution industrialization and is far less liberalized than the South 
African economy. However, in the industrial goods segment, India (14 per cent), 
Brazil (13 per cent) and South Africa (16 per cent) defend similar average tariff 
rates (WTO 2008a), but levy higher tariffs in specific industry sectors. All three 
actors consider their automobile sector as sensitive and protect it with tariffs of 
35 per cent (Brazil), 40 per cent (South Africa) and up to 100 per cent (India). In 
other industrial sectors the specific tariff rates vary remarkably (Mildner and 
Husar 2009).
In addition, the IBSA states pursue different negotiation strategies in the WTO. 
India presents its claims and is not willing to bargain. Brazil and South Africa 
apply more complex and flexible bargaining approaches by balancing protectionist 
and offensive interests in the course of the Doha Round. For instance, Brazil 
defends comparatively high tariffs for industrial goods and services, but promotes 
liberalization of the agricultural sector. India’s interests in the service sector—
information technology, engineering, etc.—are less defensive because it is taking 
advantages of the knowledge economy. With its comparative human resources 
and technological advantages, India wants to become the leader in the ‘knowledge 
revolution’ (Ray 2006: 100). New Delhi is not ready to make concessions with re-
gard to the agricultural issue in exchange for a better access to the service markets 
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of the industrialized countries. And, even though Brazil has joined certain Indian 
initiatives to liberalize services, service trade is not a priority of Brazilian WTO 
representatives (Mildner and Husar 2009: 254). South Africa is interested in 
liberalizing service trade in Mode 3 (commercial presence), but closed the doors 
to foreign participation in the area of construction, which is part of Mode 4 (pres-
ence of natural persons) negotiations (Dupas 2006: 334).
Regarding Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), India, Brazil 
and South Africa have criticized the granting of intellectual property rights on 
biological resources and traditional knowledge without due compliance with the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. The IBSA countries proposed the introduc-
tion of a mandatory requirement for the disclosure of the origin of biological 
resources in the WTO. The interests of the three countries converge with regard to 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS). India has the second largest number of HIV-positive people (2.4 million) 
and also the largest industry of generic drugs. Brazil has become the role model 
of public policies in fighting AIDS and exports its know-how to several African, 
Asian and Latin American countries. The situation in South Africa merits attention: 
it has the largest number of HIV-positive people (5.7 million) and is riddled with 
several problems in democratizing the public health services (Bueno 2009).
In recent years, the IBSA states have been the flagship of the G-21 lobby that 
succeeded in reducing the negative effects of TRIPS on patents that enforce high 
costs of HIV/AIDS drugs in developing countries, especially in Africa. An inter-
pretative statement of the 2001 Doha Declaration indicates that TRIPS should not 
prevent states from fighting public health crises. Since then, TRIPS agreement 
provides for ‘compulsory licensing’, allowing governments to issue licences for 
drug production for the domestic market without the consent of the patent owner. 
A 2003 agreement loosened the domestic market requirement, and allows develop-
ing countries to export their locally produced generics to other countries shaken 
by epidemics such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. Nonetheless, this 
timely success story does not ensure the sustainability of IBSA’s common position 
regarding intellectual property rights. Especially, India’s economy depends on the 
application of innovative technologies. To promote technological learning and to 
generate innovation capacity, India needs flexibility in the intellectual property 
law. The aim of TRIPS is to toughen the intellectual property rules.
Global Security: Low Profile in IBSA’s Agenda
Despite the aforementioned frictions in the WTO process the IBSA initiative is 
confirming the previous experiences of South–South cooperation in the 1970s and 
1980s, demonstrating greater willingness to collaborate on an economic agenda 
rather than on security issues. An explanation for this observation is that the major 
security concerns of most of the states are almost entirely regional and regions are 
an increasingly salient unit of security analysis. Particularly, India’s self-reliance 
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in military security and the issue of strategic parity in South Asia make a com-
mon IBSA approach unlikely; at the same time, Brazil and South Africa pursue 
cooperative security policies in their regions (Buzan and  Waever 2003; Lake and 
Morgan 1997; Lemke 2002).
India, Brazil and South Africa have taken a common stand on some of the 
global security problems and have engaged in niche diplomacy. For instance, with 
regard to the Middle East conflict, the excessive use of force during the Lebanese 
War (2006) that resulted in the death of a large number of civilians and the de-
struction of Lebanon’s infrastructure was condemned in the Brasilia Summit 
Declaration. Israel was indirectly accused of violating the principles of international 
humanitarian law. Concerning the Israel–Palestine conflict, da Silva, Singh and 
Mbeki criticized the collective punishment and attacks against civilians. They 
pointed out the increasing deterioration of the living conditions of the Palestinian 
population and pledged their readiness to launch technical cooperation projects in 
Gaza and the West Bank. The Foreign Ministers of IBSA called for an end to the 
continued expansion of Israeli settlements in occupied Palestinian territories at 
their Brasilia meeting in September 2009.
Additionally, IBSA’s heads of government underlined in the Joint Summit 
Declaration their commitment to the goals of disarmament and non-proliferation 
and expressed their concern over the lack of progress in the Conference on Dis-
armament. They emphasized that the objective of non-proliferation would be best 
served by systematic and progressive elimination of nuclear weapons in a non-
discriminatory and verifiable manner. At the same time, the three leaders reaffirmed 
the right of all states to peaceful application of nuclear energy and called for a 
diplomatic resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue within the framework of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
After renouncing their respective nuclear weapons programmes, Brazil and 
South Africa have developed a common position on the issue of non-proliferation 
and disarmament. South Africa was instrumental in brokering an agreement be-
tween the so-called minimalist and maximalist groupings during the NPT Review 
and Extension Conference in 1995. Pretoria succeeded in getting the conference 
to adopt an indefinite extension of the NPT and influenced two other decisions 
regarding the strengthening of the review process and a set of objectives and prin-
ciples (non-binding) on non-proliferation and disarmament. On the contrary, 
India, which is not a signatory to the NPT, decided to go nuclear. This places India 
and the other two IBSA countries at opposite sides of the nuclear divide (Sahni 
2006: 102). India and Pakistan could perhaps learn from Brazil’s bilateral re-
nunciation with Argentina that led to the Quadripartite Agreement on Nuclear 
Restrictions in 1990.4
The Indo-US nuclear deal of March 2006 has the potential to ‘regularize’ 
India’s nuclear deterrence and open the channels for commerce in civilian nuclear 
technologies with India. In particular, South Africa is among the most influential 
members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The NSG had to legitimize the 
Indo-US nuclear deal and the decisions of Brazil and South Africa were seen to be 
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critical to the viability of IBSA from the Indian perspective (Sahni 2006). When 
Indian Prime Minister Singh visited Pretoria only two weeks after the IBSA 
Summit in Brasilia, President Mbeki announced that South Africa would back 
India’s bid for membership in the NSG to gain access to international technology 
for civilian nuclear energy programmes (Business Day, 3 October 2006). South 
Africa’s support to the Indo-US deal indicates a major shift from a rule-and-
principle-based to a more pragmatic non-proliferation policy.
The New Delhi Plan of Action (2004) has identified the following areas for 
trilateral defence and security cooperation:
? Joint peacekeeping, training and military personnel exchange;
? Promoting maritime and air safety, including combating illegal weapons 
and narcotics traffic and maritime transit of toxic chemicals across the 
Indian and Atlantic Oceans;
? Cooperation in armaments industries, research and development, trade and 
marketing.
The second IBSA Maritime exercise—IBSAMAR II—was held in September 
2010 in South Africa, with India playing a lead role in planning and conducting it. 
Yet, the ambitious agenda for defence cooperation has not been put into action so 
far. Once actions are taken, the trilateral defence cooperation would contribute to 
global security.
Cementing the Coalition by Sectoral Cooperation
IBSA’s sectoral collaboration aims at mutually reinforcing the economic strength 
by synergizing their complementarities in the areas of industry, services, trade and 
technology. Optimistic analysts foresee the creation of an IBSA market of 1.2 
billion people, (US)$1.2 trillion of GDP and foreign trade of nearly $400 billion 
in the long-term (Kumar 2006: 18). The trilateral coalition is willing to construct 
a strong South–South cooperation that is thought to spill over to their respective 
regions and to promote inter- and cross-regional economic ties. The IBSA coun-
tries have created a Trilateral Business Council to facilitate contacts and promote 
commerce across their regions. Business seminars were held during the IBSA 
summits in Brasilia, Pretoria and New Delhi. The mutual state visits of da Silva, 
Mbeki and Singh in recent years have always been accompanied by a large con-
tingent of business leaders.
IBSA’s sectoral cooperation seeks to exploit synergies in issue areas of mutual 
interest by sharing expertise and best practices of the three countries. At the sev-
eral IBSA ministerial meetings since 2003, trilateral working groups were created 
to discuss cooperation in trade and investment, energy security, infrastructure 
and transportation, information society, science and technology, defence, public 
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administration, education, health, agriculture, tourism, social and cultural issues. 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and agreements were signed in IBSA’s 
main focus sectors: health, trade, transportation and energy security.
Trade between India, Brazil and South Africa currently accounts for $10 billion 
a year (Business Day, 14 September 2009). The Action Plan on Trade Facilitation, 
signed at the First IBSA Summit, is a milestone on IBSA’s path towards a trilateral 
free trade agreement. It sought to further increase trade flows between the three 
countries and their regions. Simultaneously, India-Mercosur5 and Mercosur-
SACU concluded preferential trade agreements. India and SACU intend to estab-
lish a tariff preference agreement. Crucial gains are expected to derive from these 
inter-regional agreements. However, the different levels of economic inter-
nationalization in India, Brazil and South Africa can constrain their bilateral and 
trilateral trade relations and limit their common interests in the WTO. Even then, 
at the Pretoria Summit in October 2007, the IBSA states declared that their trade 
would grow from $10 billion to $15 billion by 2010.
Due to its comparatively small and liberalized economy, South Africa has 
experienced trade deficit with India and Brazil. A study carried out by a South 
African think-tank on the potential impact of free trade arrangements with India 
and Brazil, found that the benefits for the South African economy would be ‘rela-
tively modest’ when compared to other regional opportunities (Stern and Stevens 
2000). It singled out the difficulties in negotiating tariff reductions to protected 
industries in India. Similarly, Dupas (2006: 334) argues that the South African and 
Indian economies have little complementarities. However, Pretoria still nego-
tiates preferential trade agreements with New Delhi and Brasilia. In the long run, 
the preferential access to these big economies will cover technology, knowledge 
and energy transfers.
Despite the critical prognosis, South Africa’s economic relations with India 
have improved over the years.6 Bilateral trade reached as high as $2.9 billion in 
2007 (WTO 2008b). In regard to South African–Brazilian trade relations, it must 
be noted that South Africa’s exports consist in most part of primary resources, 
whereas Brazil’s exports are mostly industrial products.7 In addition, the size of 
South Africa’s economy is less than one-third that of Brazil. South Africa’s total 
trade volume is nearly half the total trade of Brazil. Despite these differences, 
Brazil’s trade with South Africa increased significantly to $2.3 billion in 2007 
following the devaluation of the Brazilian Real (WTO 2008b).
Many barriers such as distance, language, shipping costs and non-availability 
of a direct air link complicate the commercial ties between Brazil and India.8 Add-
itionally, the Brazilian business community has expressed strong reservations 
about any serious shift in economic priorities away from its traditional markets 
(Alden and Vieira 2005: 1092). Nevertheless, trade between Brazil and India has 
tripled to $3.1 billion during 2001–2007 and it seems to be growing rapidly (WTO 
2008b). In 2004, India and Brazil signed an agreement to reduce trade barriers 
in agribusiness, chemical industries and automobiles. In March 2005, a bilateral 
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free trade agreement between Brasilia and New Delhi was concluded (WTO 
2005: 148). Indian decision-makers see the strengthening of commercial ties with 
Brazil as a bridge to enter the US market. 
Economic cooperation among India, Brazil and South Africa is hampered by 
the fact that they produce similar products and compete for access to the Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) markets. Given the 
distance, strengthening transport links assumes importance for exploiting the full 
potential of trade and investments. At the first Brasilia Summit, a Maritime Trans-
portation Agreement was concluded to improve logistics and maritime skill bases. 
The Trilateral Working Group on Transportation prepared an MoU on civil 
aviation in order to establish regular air links between the three countries. In 2004, 
cooperation agreements between the national airlines were signed to simplify 
goods and passenger traffic. The transportation sector presents opportunities for 
exchanging best practices as well.9
The energy sector is another pivotal area of cooperation that was spelled out at 
the September 2006 Summit, where an MoU on bio-fuels was signed. About 
62 per cent of the energy requirements of Brazil are met by renewable sources; of 
these, 10 per cent come from ethanol produced from sugarcane. In April 2002 
India and Brazil signed an MoU to share technology for blending petrol and diesel 
with ethanol. It must be noted that India is the world’s largest sugarcane producer. 
Solar energy and coal liquefaction are potential areas of further cooperation.10
On future cooperation in nuclear technology, the Joint Declaration issued at the 
Brasilia Summit in 2006 stated that:
[The three heads of state and government] agreed that international civilian nuclear co-
operation, under appropriate IAEA safeguards, amongst countries committed to nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation objectives could be enhanced through acceptable 
forward-looking approaches, consistent with the respective national and international 
obligations.
South Africa intends to overcome the energy shortage in its urban conglomera-
tions by making huge investments in the construction of nuclear plants; Brazil 
controls the full nuclear fuel cycle since March 2006 (Flemes 2006b). The three 
southern powers seem determined to seek large-scale synergies in nuclear energy 
production.
Conclusion
IBSA’s success in forging sectoral collaboration is mixed. In particular, bilateral 
and trilateral trade flows are limited due to several constraints. The different size 
and degrees of global integration of the economies have led to varying amounts 
of trade benefits. The main obstacle has been the limited complementarities be-
tween the three economies because they produce similar products and compete 
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for access to the OECD markets. But trade is merely one of the many under-
takings in this multidimensional initiative. India, Brazil and South Africa are not 
natural trading partners and the limits to commercial exchanges should be rec-
ognized. While a trilateral trade agreement has been alluded to on numerous 
occasions, such an ambitious undertaking is unlikely to materialize because all 
three countries are technically linked to regional trade blocs. A more realistic 
approach should concentrate on trade facilitation and improvement of transport 
and infrastructure links between the three states.
In effect, IBSA is unlikely to focus on mutual trade relations. Other sectors 
such as energy security, transportation infrastructure and health policies seem to 
offer more opportunities. IBSA’s success in sectoral cooperation will depend on 
its ability to pragmatically focus on distinct areas of cooperation and avoid areas 
of doubtful complementarities that tend to hold up the cooperation process. In 
sum, the convergence of interests with regard to the multilateral reform project at 
the global level are much more obvious than the expected synergies of sectoral 
cooperation. However, if we define sectoral cooperation as a mechanism to cement 
the broader strategy of soft balancing in order to shift the global power distribution, 
the short-term profits of trade are not a major criterion for the success of IBSA.
The soft balancing approach of the emerging coalition has already left its foot-
print on the recent global order. Its effective participation in global institutions 
through ‘network diplomacy’ (Heine 2006) and informal ‘steering committees’ 
(Ikenberry and Wright 2008) that are easier to join than, for instance, the UN 
Security Council, might impact the character of multilateralism and, in particular, 
its procedural values in the long-term. The establishment of the G-20 as the new 
steering committee for global economic governance at the 2009 Pittsburgh 
Summit, reflected this new mode of global multilateralism. The establishment of 
new global clubs and groupings is reinforced by Washington’s need for burden-
sharing and its perceived ineffectiveness of formal multilateralism. It also con-
firmed the arrival of the IBSA states in the club of global decision-makers. India, 
Brazil and South Africa have been amongst the most powerful drivers of incre-
mental change in world diplomacy and they benefit from the connected global 
power shifts. Future bargaining in global trade and climate policies will have to 
include the core interests of the emerging powers. Soft balancing by way of com-
bining middle power discourse and latent multi-institutionalization has been an 
effective and successful strategy adopted against the background of a global order 
dominated by the major powers and shaped through formal and informal inter-
national groupings. Those players who engage in network diplomacy and, there-
fore, effectively operate within global institutions and steering committees as 
innovators, coalition-builders and spokesmen, while preserving their sovereignty 
and independence, have the potential to substantially influence the outcomes of 
future global politics.
IBSA has been the launching pad for its member-states’ ascent in the global 
hierarchy of states and will remain a motor of global institutional reforms in the 
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future. They will strive collectively for the establishment of predictable, rule-
based and transparent international trading and finance systems as well as for 
reform of the UN Security Council. But these goals are shared by many other gov-
ernments (for example, Germany and Japan) and unlikely to materialize in the 
medium-term. Regarding issues in the WTO negotiations, it is likely that India, 
Brazil and South Africa will build ad hoc coalitions in specific issue areas that are 
marked by common interests such as patents of HIV/AIDS drugs under the TRIPS 
agreement.
Due to divergent national interests, different bargaining strategies and power 
asymmetries amongst its members, IBSA is unlikely to negotiate successfully the 
global governance issues on the basis of common positions. This applies to the 
majority of the Doha Round issues: agriculture, industrial tariffs and services. In 
the current constellation, the function of IBSA/G-3 is limited to agenda-setting 
and influencing the WTO negotiations. Global security problems such as nuclear 
proliferation generally play a minor role in the policies of the coalition. Particularly, 
India pursues its national security policy and great power ambition at the expense 
of multilateral agreements because its nuclear power status undermines the non-
proliferation regime. In contrast, Brazil relies more on institutional strategies and 
soft power projection, which makes it a serious supporter of formal multilateralism 
and the UN reform. In addition, the significance of IBSA, particularly with regard 
to the foreign economic policy agenda of the three states, differs considerably 
between them. IBSA has a rather low profile in India and much higher economic 
and political value in Brazil, while its global impact is highly important for South 
Africa.
From the foregoing discussion, a few pointers may be indicated for the future 
of IBSA. First, IBSA’s success will depend on its ability to focus on distinct areas 
of cooperation and avoid or postpone those controversial issues that tend to derail 
the cooperation process. Second, the member-states must consolidate their com-
mon strategy by mutually verifying their willingness for collective action. Al-
though some authors have criticized IBSA for lack of a clear policy (Alden and 
Vieira 2005: 1088), a strategy of soft balancing by using institutional instruments 
has unfolded. Third, it is more appropriate to focus on the lack of institutionalization 
rather than the absence of strategy. IBSA is not a formal organization; common 
institutions would facilitate the effective coordination and pursuit of its interests. 
Further, collective institutions could form the ground for the exchange of social 
norms and cultural values. Better mutual knowledge and confidence-building 
between the three societies would amalgamate the group. 
A question arises as to whether the enlargement of the trilateral coalition would 
generate potential synergies in sectoral collaboration and add even more weight 
in global governance institutions. On the one hand, the excessively large and 
amorphous membership and equally broad agenda of previous South–South 
groupings such as the G-77 prevented any constructive progress or effective out-
come. On the other, the choice is that IBSA could take on board China and Russia 
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to form BRICSA or the traditional civilian powers such as Germany and Japan 
to build a G-5, while maintaining its characteristics as a small but potentially 
effective coalition. The IBSA states’ overtures to China and Russia reflect more of 
the strategic recognition of the need of their support as permanent UN Security 
Council members than an attempt at winning their participation as such. Not-
withstanding its strategic and economic attraction, incorporating China and Russia 
could dilute IBSA’s agenda and undermine its cohesiveness. IBSA’s common 
identity is based on values such as democracy, personal freedom and human 
rights. The participation of China and Russia, both not known for their democratic 
practices and commitment to human rights, would not only undercut collective 
norms and identities but also undermine the credibility and legitimacy of IBSA’s 
global justice discourse. In comparison, widening the coalition to include Germany 
and Japan would strengthen IBSA’s common identity based on democracy and 
human rights, increase its legitimacy and acceptance, and promote its commitment 
towards democratization of international relations. In addition, the participation 
of Berlin and Tokyo in a G-5 forum would reflect their solidarity with the Third 
World democracies in their demand for a larger role in institutions of global 
governance.
Notes
1. For the text of the Declaration following the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, 
South Africa and India in Brasília on 6 June 2003, see http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2005/
ibsa_brasilia.htm
2. Closing remarks made by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the Second IBSA Summit 
in October 2007.
3. The SACU includes South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia.
4. Argentina–Brazil nuclear negotiations, which were initiated in the mid-1980s, led to a 
cumulative process of non-proliferation negotiations, nowadays considered as an arche-
type for nuclear weapon free zones. In November 1990 the two countries signed the 
Quadripartite Agreement together with the IAEA and ABACC (Agencia Brasileño 
Argentina de Contabilidad y Control). Now Brazil and Argentina form the centre of 
gravity of southern Latin America’s security community (Flemes 2006a).
5. Mercosur is a trading bloc in Latin America comprising Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and 
Paraguay. It has Chile and Bolivia as its associate members.
6. South African companies have invested in India in diamond mines and jewellery pro-
duction, alcoholic beverages and financial services. Indian companies have invested 
in automobiles, information technology, alcoholic beverages, pharmaceuticals, infra-
structure, insurance and hotels.
7. Currently, three quarters of South African exports to Brazil consist of mineral products, 
chemicals and base metals. South Africa’s imports from Brazil consist largely of 
machinery, vehicles, vehicle components and chemicals.
8. Brazilian enterprises invest in India’s construction, infrastructure and energy sector. 
The Brazilian government has invited Indian companies to invest in agribusiness, infor-
mation technology and automobiles.
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on January 9, 2014isq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
International Studies, 46, 4 (2009): 401–421
India-Brazil-South Africa in the New Global Order 419
 9. India’s expertise in the automation of railways can be extended to South Africa and 
Brazil. Similarly, India and South Africa can learn from the Brazilian experiences in the 
introduction of private capital to improve railway efficiency. India, with its renowned 
maritime training institutes, can offer modern maritime training to seafarers of South 
Africa and Brazil. South Africa’s experiences in port management can be extended to 
the Indian port authorities (Kumar 2006: 19).
10. India’s capabilities in the field of solar photovoltaic could be of considerable interest to 
Brazil and South Africa, given the climate and vastness of these countries. South Africa 
has a highly developed synthetic fuels industry. This industry takes advantage of the 
country’s abundant coal resources and has developed an expertise in the technology 
of coal liquefaction. In view of high oil prices, this technology may be commercially 
viable and could be explored by Indian companies.
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